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Integrated safety case development for deep geological repositories

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


ESDRED International Conference, 16-18 June 2008, Czech Technical University – Prague, Czech Republic




Introduction - the Safety Case in context

- Demonstration of safety requires more than conventional performance assessment, hence widespread use of “**Safety Case**”
- Emphasis to date is on post-closure safety; as repositories move closer towards implementation, more aspects need to be considered
- In real life, trade-offs are needed between factors influencing operational safety / practicality and post-closure safety
- There may be benefits in widening the definition of “**Safety Case**” to explicitly account for all the issues to be considered when decisions associated with repository design are made




OECD/NEA 2004

Stepwise development of the Safety Case




Components and application of the Safety Case



Example of application

- Japanese disposal concept for vitrified HLW from reprocessing
- Generic design based on robust EBS
- Post-closure safety requires assured quality of the emplaced engineered barriers
- Operational safety requires very high reliability of tele-operated equipment: procedures should be simple, fail-safe and allow easy recovery in case of perturbations



Repository layout

| | Pit disposal | Tunnel disposal |
|--|--------------|-----------------|
| Hard rock (max depth 1,000m) | | |
| Soft rock (max depth 500m) | | |

Potential Siting Environments in Japan


Keeping Flexibility

Geological and Geomorphological Environment

Site Characterization


Repository design, Construction and Operation

Performance Assessment



Key issues: Future Environmental Evolution

Volunteer approach to select candidate sites



Remote handled EBS emplacement


- To form a basis for design optimisation, a wide range of **different operational procedures** were examined for both vertical and horizontal emplacement options
- Although, in principle, all are feasible and would meet **post-closure safety requirements**, there are considerable differences in practicality and operational robustness
- For sensible comparison, the simple sketches that formed the basis for laboratory tests need to be **transformed into operational procedures appropriate to a working repository**

| | <i>Bentonite Block</i> | <i>CIP</i> | <i>In-situ Compaction</i> | <i>Pellet</i> | <i>Pre Fabricate Module</i> |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|------------|---------------------------|---------------|-----------------------------|
| <i>Bentonite Vertical</i> | | | | | |
| <i>Bentonite Horizontal</i> | | | | | |

Idealised concepts for overpack / buffer emplacement studied in the RWMC Remote Handling project

Realistic starting point

- For operational analysis, idealised concepts used in the past have to be replaced with realistic specification of the components needed for a safe facility:
 - Drainage systems
 - Tunnel & borehole liners
 - Borehole caps & plugs
 - Temporary infrastructure for ventilation, power supply, communication, monitoring, etc. which may leave traces after its removal
 - Infrastructure that may be abandoned in place – rails for heavy equipment, lifting plates, transport shells, etc.



Expanded Safety Case definition

- In order to ensure that all relevant factors are considered in the decision making process for selection of repository design variants, it is useful to consider an expanded definition of the **Safety Case that explicitly acknowledges all the issues that need to be considered in a real construction project**


NUMO design factors

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Long-term safety | robustness of the post-closure safety case |
| 2 | Operational safety | conventional and radiological safety of construction, operation and decommissioning |
| 3 | Engineering feasibility | fundamental feasibility of construction and operation to defined quality levels |
| 4 | Engineering reliability | practicality of implementation in view of operational boundary conditions and robustness with regard to potential perturbations |
| 5 | Site characterisation | effort required to satisfy technical requirements for site characterisation and monitoring data |
| 6 | Retrievability | ease of retrieval after emplacement |
| 7 | Environmental impact | extent of all environmental impacts associated with repository implementation |
| 8 | Socio-political and economic aspects | factors contributing to costs and acceptance by all key stakeholders |




Post-closure safety in perspective

- Assuring safety after repository closure is clearly important for acceptance of a project, but current repositories have huge safety reserves - maximum **hypothetical** risks are orders of magnitude below regulatory limits and occur only in the distant future
- Construction and operation are complex and hazardous jobs (conventional risks); design should reduce **real** risks to workers
- Costs are huge compared to hazard; principle of sustainability would suggest that **use of valuable resources** in such projects should be kept within reasonable bounds



Trade-offs

- There is rarely a best possible solution to an engineering problem - usually a balance has to be made between pros and cons of different options, e.g. between variants:
 - that minimise the amount of additional materials left in place
 - that are less vulnerable to perturbations (e.g. loss of power)
 - that are easier to reverse / remediate in case of accidents




Variants to add operational robustness to an electromagnetic hoist for overpack emplacement:
- left; mechanical lifting collar
- right; lower support platform that is left in place

Realistic safety assessment (1)

Long term safety is clearly important, but must be quantified in a realistic manner


- Models must be able to consider the impact of different geometries and also system evolution during construction and operation in order to distinguish between different operational variants




Realistic safety assessment (2)

- Models must also be able to evaluate the long-term consequences of all materials left in place in order to provide input for decisions on trade-offs with operational safety / practicality

Look at just before EBS emplacement and Just after closure




Storyboard: Influence on Bentonite Qualities




Initial Quality of Bentonite




Storyboard: Influence on Bentonite Qualities





Storyboard: Influence on Bentonite Qualities



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Storyboard: Influence on Bentonite Qualities




Stepwise move towards site-specific designs

- Although designs need to be as realistic as possible for operational analysis, the extent to which they can be **tailored to sites** will develop as the siting process proceeds

| | LS Stage (PI selection) | PI stage (DI selection) | DI stage (Site selection) | Licensing stage |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|--|
| Construction & Operation | Only very superficial analysis | Operational scenarios which influence post-closure safety Site-specific construction / operational risks | All scenarios which influence post-closure safety (site specific). Scenarios for construction / operation safety case | All scenarios which influence post-closure safety (layout specific) Scenarios for construction / operation safety case |
| EBS | Based on H12 (HLW only) Qualitative discussion of divergences (particularly in terms of geometry, additional components) | Realistic base case with consideration of all major design components (HLW: maybe simplified for TRU) Quantitative analysis of major perturbations | Realistic base case with consideration of all design components (HLW & ?TRU) Quantitative analysis of all significant perturbations | Realistic base case with all components and reference layout (HLW & ?TRU) Quantitative analysis of all significant perturbations |
| Geosphere | Based on H12 Main focus on boundary conditions for EBS assessment Simplified site-specific transport of RN | Base case site-specific, as realistic as possible Full assessment of perturbations to EBS and FF RN transport | Base case realistic (site specific) Full assessment of perturbations to EBS and FF performance | Base case realistic (layout specific) Full assessment of perturbations to EBS and FF performance |
| Biosphere | H12-based, stylised but related to site location in terms of materials fluxes and standard lifestyle | Site-specific, realistic base case Alternative stylised scenarios appropriate to site | Site-specific, realistic base case Range of alternative stylised scenarios appropriate to site | Site-specific, realistic base case Range of alternative stylised scenarios appropriate to site |
| External perturbations | Site-specific, with focus on geological disturbances | Site-specific, considering all geological, climatic, anthropogenic, ... perturbations | Site-specific, considering all geological, climatic, anthropogenic, ... perturbations | Site-specific, considering all geological, climatic, anthropogenic, ... perturbations |
| Supporting arguments | Very general, analogues for site and EBS stability: laboratory demonstrations. | Site- and concept-specific, analogues for geological and EBS stability; local fluxes. Full-scale demonstrations | Set of supporting arguments for all main SC components (analogues, natural fluxes, etc.). Full-scale, long term demonstrations (post-closure). | Comprehensive set of supporting arguments for all main SC components. Full-scale, long term demonstrations (operational and post-closure). |
| Closure & monitoring | General closure concept (H12 base): baseline monitoring plan | Site specific closure concept, extended baseline monitoring plan (URL), general monitoring concept. | Site specific monitoring & closure concepts, outline baseline monitoring plan (construction & operation), response concepts. | Site specific monitoring & closure concepts: baseline monitoring and response plan (construction & operation). |
| Coupling between sites | Little Š medium (possibly none if few sites) | Medium - high | Very high | None (formally) Š but selection process may be needed to support SC /SEA |

An integrated design process

- Design is a complex process requiring integration of top-level requirements - as specified, in particular, by long-term safety assessment - with working level practical constraints set by the individual steps that need to be carried out in a difficult working environment



Conclusions and future requirements

- Repository design is moving from an early idealised phase into one focusing on **operational practicality and safety**
- Although long term safety is a key concern, in real life there must be **trade-offs with other operational constraints**
- In order to make decision-making more transparent, an **expanded Safety Case** definition could be useful
- A toolkit has been developed to aid choosing between design variants; nevertheless, this needs to be supported by **practical experience gained in realistic, full-scale experiments**, which should be a priority for the future

Acknowledgements

This paper is based on concepts developed during a number of projects including Alternative Repository Concepts / Remote Handling (supported by RWMC) and HLW Repository Concept Catalogue (supported by NUMO).